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BOOK REVIEW
THOUGHTS AND LIVES
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER

SELF. By G. Edward White. New York, Oxford University Press, 1993.
Pp. 628. $37.50

LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE. By Gerald Gunther.
New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1994. Pp. 818. $35.00
Reviewed by William P. LaPiana*
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Learned Hand shared a number of
characteristics. Both well-known judges, they had uncommonly long
careers on the bench and in old age attained a remarkable degree of public

prominence. It is not too much to say that the legal profession idolized
them both, and certain of their opinions remain staples of law school
teaching. Both men even looked the part: Holmes' dramatic moustache
and Hand's bushy eyebrows lent credence to the adjective
"distinguished." 1 Now they both are the subjects of monumental

biographies.
I
Gerald Gunther's Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge is an

authorized biography, in the sense that the author was given exclusive

access to Hand's enormous collection of papers. 2 Authorized though it

may be, it is also independent and certainly is not hagiography.

G.

Edward White's Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self
was made possible by the collapse of the attempt to secure the writing of
* Rita and Joseph Solomon Professor of Wills, Trusts, and Estates, New York Law
School. I thank my colleague Edward A. Purcell, Jr. for his comments and
encouragement.
1. "[Hand's] rugged square features and imposing eyebrows became the public's
ideal of what a judge should look like . . . ." Lewis F. Powell, Jr., foreword to
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE at xi (1994).
"[Holmes] was exceptionally attractive, especially as he aged and his countenance, with
its piercing eyes, shock of white hair and prominent moustache, seemed to reflect the
roles of soldier and jurist that had been so important in his life." G. EDWARD WHIT,
JuSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 3 (1993).
2. It should be noted that Professor Gunther was generous in allowing others to use
the Hand papers as Professor White's "Preface" shows. WHIr=, supranote 1, at ix.
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an authorized biography of the justice and the subsequent opening and
dissemination in microfilm form of the Holmes papers. 3 Authorized or
not, both works share the aura of being something of the last word.
Important events and aspects of the lives of the subjects are carefully
examined and every bit of evidence seemingly has been unearthed in order
to provide the clearest possible picture. Whether the question is why
Hand was never appointed to the Supreme Court or why Holmes suddenly
abandoned his new position at the Harvard Law School to accept
appointment to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, it is difficult to
imagine going beyond the answers presented. In short, White and
Gunther have given us the standard against which all subsequent efforts
will be measured.
Like their subjects, the books exhibit some common characteristics.
Both are gracefully written, although Gunther's work probably will be
more accessible to lay people than those portions of White's study which
closely examine Holmes's writings. Both are based on enormous research
in the voluminous original sources. The books do differ, however, in
their scope. Gunther devotes less space to discussing Hand's intellectual
premises and outlooks. His work is more concerned with the details of
Hand's life; in a sense, it is, if that is possible, more of a "biography,"
more the complete story of a life. There are more comings and goings,
and more details about daily life and actions. In terms of traditional
biography, Gunther's work is more definitive than White's, which is much
more an intellectual and personal history of his subject the aim of which
is as much to illuminate the personality of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. as
to describe his thought.
In spite of these differences in form, Gunther and White share the
same broad interpretive framework: an emphasis on the distinctive aspects
of their subjects' personalities. Gunther shows that Hand "viewed himself
as beset and driven by self-doubts." 4 He analyzes Hand's "style of
modest judging" 5 in light of that inability to fasten on absolute truth.
"[T]he questioning, open-minded human being could not help acting that
way as a judge." 6 One source of those self-doubts was the memory of his
father, "a memory that was more of a myth than of a reality," fostered in
great part by Hand's mother, Lydia Coit Learned Hand. 7 This self-doubt
fed a skepticism which marked Hand's outlook on life. Gunther believes
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 591-92.
GUNTHER, supra note 1, at xvii.
Id.
Id.

7. Id. at 133.
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that "Hand's unease with an aggressive judicial role was but one aspect"
of the skepticism that marked his life.'
White's analysis of Holmes's inner life reveals some interesting
parallels to Hand's. Just as the younger man was driven by his father's
assumed reputation, Holmes was driven by his need to exceed his father's
widely acknowledged fame and mark out his own place in the world while
at the same time, in a sense, following in the elder Holmes's footsteps. 9
Holmes, according to White, had a "life plan" which "was a product of
the discernible similarity between his father's and his own life goals and
the discernible difference in their personalities." 1 °
Holmes, too, was a skeptic, and indeed Hand invoked his name often
in justifying his own restrained approach to judging. White claims that
Holmes's skepticism was "a well-developed and refined philosophical
position," which did not, however, guide his life." He approached life
with a relish which belied any belief that what he did or could do would
nof really matter. If Hand was often filled with self-doubt and questioned
his abilities, Holmes was confident that he was important and that what he
did and wrote really mattered. Like Hand, he often deprecated the honors
and adulation which came to him, as they came to Hand, later in life, but
White calls this "'pseudohu m ility,'" an attempt to bring his doubts into the
open where they would "dissipate." '
Other features of personality, however, distinguished the two judges.
Hand married and fathered three daughters, and, while Gunther does not
provide many details about his family life, it seems that he enjoyed his
children and grandchildren and entered into fatherhood with the relish that
Holmes usually reserved for his work. Indeed, Holmes approached his
life with the belief that it should center around him. "It is one of the
ironies of Holmes's career," White writes, "that although he cared so
much for recognition, and although so many persons, over the years, have
made an investment in his ideas or his work or his life, he gave so little
of himself to the persons around him, even those whom he loved."13
Most striking is the difference in their relationships with their wives.
Fanny Dixwell Holmes was her husband's helper. She managed the
household, reluctantly but effectively played the Washington hostess once
Wendell was appointed to the United States Supreme Court, and, White
observes, "implicitly permitted herself to be relegated to a distinctly
8. Id. at xii.
9. W-rrE, supranote 1, at 11-14.
10. Id. at 14.
11. Id. at 481.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 411.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 39

bounded realm of Holmes's existence: a realm not less central for its
bounded quality, but limited nonetheless." 14 So bounded was that role,
that when Holmes sought passionate involvement with others he often
sought it outside of marriage, especially during his solo trips to England
where he fell in love with Clare Castleton, with whom he carried on a
passionate correspondence. White concludes that speculation about
whether or not they had a physical relationship is a "fruitless exercise"
while acknowledging that the evidence of Holmes's letters makes it seem
unlikely.' 5
Frances Fincke Hand was a different sort of woman. One of the first
graduates of Bryn Mawr, she thought long and hard before she accepted
Hand's proposal of marriage, especially because it conflicted with her
desire to enter into a "Boston marriage" with her intimate friend and
classmate, Mildred Minturn. 11 Gunther cautions that we should not read
this as indications that the two women were lovers. Such arrangements
were common in the period, appealing as they did to the "New Woman"
who sought "more than domesticity."7 It was "a living arrangement
with another woman who shared similar aspirations" which "was thought
to be more supportive and rewarding than traditional marriage, especially
when one has not yet met a man who could be a 'husband-friend' as well
as a 'husband-lover' and who would respect one's autonomy."18
Once married, Frances formed a "passionate" attachment to Louis
Dow, a Dartmouth professor. Unlike Wendell and Clare, however,
Frances and Louis spent long periods of time together, both during the
summer while Learned remained in New York, and on trips they made to
Europe without the judge. Gunther concludes that there is no evidence of
a physical affair,19 and Learned Hand remained on good terms with Dow
until the latter's death in 1944. Even more important, Hand remained
passionately devoted to his wife, reproaching himself for any shortcomings
in their relationship and writing her adoring letters until the end of his
life. Nothing could better illustrate the difference between the two judges.
Holmes taking it for granted that his world revolved around himself; Hand
always beset with worries that he was deeply flawed in every sense.
14. Id. at 107. While Holmes himself indicated that he and his vfe were childless
by design, White suggests "the most likely explanation for the Holmes' childlessness
appears to be that at least one of the participants in the marriage was infertile, although
there is no direct evidence confirming that supposition." Id. at 106.
15. Id. at 249.

16. GUNTrHER, supra note 1, at 95-96.
17. Id.

18. Id. at 96.
19. See id. at 185.
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Gunther clearly links Hand's reverence for judicial restraint with his
self-doubt. Hand seems to have had a limited view of his institutional role
because he was convinced that he could do no more. He declared himself
a member of the "Society of Jobbists" of which Holmes was president.
A jobbist was committed above all to doing one's job well. Hand's view
was that Holmes "had attained serenity and experienced the joy of
creation."' For Hand, however, "solace was usually the more modest
consequence of commitment to craftsmanship." 2" Holmes did indeed use
the term "jobbism" to refer to his approach to his work. For him,
however, it "was the logical culmination of his own self-confidence in
being a gifted professional."' Holmes knew how good he was, and he
seized every opportunity to prove it to the world.
According to White, Holmes's personality did influence his judging.
It helped to foster the "ambivalence about the professional role he
occupied."' His desire for greatness led him to treat opinions as "forms
of words" through which he could express his insights and philosophical
outlook. He assumed, according to White, that to be a celebrated jurist
required "doctrinal consistency and theoretical integrity,"I yet he desired
to be the philosopher-judge. With Holmes's judicial work, "what starts
as a purported exercise in doctrinal analysis quickly disintegrates,
revealing beneath the surface other language-language communicating the
human, intellectual, and cultural dimensions of Holmes's opinions. " '
White makes this point most vividly in discussing Holmes's free speech
opinions, persuasively arguing that they cannot be read as coherent
doctrinal statements. Rather, they are reflections of "cultural and
ideological messages" of the first three decades of the twentieth
century.
White makes the broader point quite bluntly: "Holmes the
judge was often consumed by the sheer attraction of language itself." 2'
For all the common emphasis on personality, the works do differ.
White spends a great deal of time and effort on close analyses of Holmes's
writings, as befits a study of a judge who put so much effort into choosing
the words he used to convey his opinions. A clear example, which also
delineates Holmes's attitude toward his judicial work and colleagues on the
bench, is White's analysis of two sentences Holmes wrote to Felix
20. Id. at 404.
21. Id.
22. WHrE, supra note 1, at 296.

23. Id. at 452.

24. Id. at 453.
25. Id. at 454.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 444.
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Frankfirter during a break in one of the Supreme Court's conferences:
"'I stepped out of a cloud of biting mosquitoes for a word of freedom with
you. Now I go back to the swamp. ' "' White first notes that during his
service in the Peninsula campaign of 1862, "Holmes had marched through
swamps and had doubtless been exposed to mosquitoes."" In the note
to Frankfurter, however, release from those annoyances is a "'word of
freedom." White suggests that Holmes found his colleagues on the Court
to be an annoyance, "but the principal effect of their presences was to
inhibit and annoy his language. " ' Holmes's life was to a great degree
lived through his words, and his biographer's work is to a great degree
accomplished through the close analysis of those words.
Both books, of course, are biographies, not general histories of the
period of their subjects' lives. One of the fascinations of biography,
however, is the insight it gives into the history the subject lived. We can
imagine the past much better when we can imagine the lives of
individuals. The imagining is all the more vivid when the lives we
examine have something in common with our own. An American lawyer
reading these two books almost certainly will try to relate his or her
understanding of the legal world in which we live to these two lives lived
in legal worlds more or less like our own. What can be learned about our
own lives from these two lives should be all the more interesting because
Hand and Holmes not only are of two different generations, but also of
two different legal cultures: Holmes is of the nineteenth century and Hand
of the twentieth.
What follows is an attempt to outline some of the differences between
those two legal cultures by using the contributions both biographies make
to our understanding of two exemplary lives. First, I consider the
differences between Holmes and Hand revealed by these works. Second,
I try to generalize these differences into a highly tentative view of the
transition from nineteenth to twentieth century legal culture, considered as
a problem in intellectual history.
II
A
A review of the two biographies is a good place to begin such a
project because both books are more than fine examples of an important
genre which has always had a significant place in the study of history.
They also represent a particular way of doing legal history, or, rather, of
28. Id. at 314.
29. Id.

30. Id.
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doing the intellectual history of law. One of the characteristics of the
legal history done by American law professors since perhaps the 1960s has

been close attention to the role law plays in supporting dominant social
structures. That attention was first expressed by scholars loosely grouped
together as the law and society movement. Their most prominent
practitioner is James Willard Hurst whose careful, detailed study of the

relationship between the law and the Wisconsin timber industry is a classic

example of the approach.3 1 In that approach law is both the servant and

reflection of a broad social consensus on the importance of economic
growth and the production of wealth.'

Another expression of the scholarly interest in the relationship
between law and social structure was a "soft" form of Marxism, which,
in its crudest form maintains that all ideas are merely superstructure, built
on the reality of ownership of the means of production. This approach to

the study of legal history is associated with that loose conglomeration of

scholars known as the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement. 3 CLS

is far more nuanced and has been far more influential than a sentence or
two can describe.'

In briefest compass, the CLS historians see far less

consensus in American history and tend to emphasize the ways in which
the legal system aided the powerful. The most prominent historian

associated with CLS is Morton Horwitz, whose first book, The
Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, published in 1977, was
subjected to strong criticism because of the assumption that it was based
on just such a soft Marxist approach.35 To sum it up as pithily as
31. JANMES WRILARD HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1964). For Hurst's
personal view of his work and the state of legal history, see Dirk Hartog, Snakes in
Ireland:A Conversation with Willard Hurst, 12 LAW & HIST. REVIEW 370-90 (1994).
32. In his interview with Hartog, Hurst says: "The thing that is significant to me
is that just dealing with the facts and records shows the extent to which there was almost
no question about the idea of economic progress, in the sense of increased output of
goods and services, as a good in itself, regardless. There was almost no dissent to that
attitude." See Hartog, supranote 31, at 387.
33. For a brief discussion of the history of the CLS approach to history, see Daniel
R. Ernst, The CriticalTraditionin the Writing of American Legal History, 102 Yale L.J.
1023-34 (1993).
34. Indeed, Ernst points out that some advocates of CLS have moved beyond a
structural approach to history and into "post-modernism." Id. at 1032.
35. See, e.g., John Phillip Reid, A Plot Too Doctrinaire,55 Tex. L. Rev. 1307,
1315 (1977) (book review) ("There is no neutrality in the legal history of Horowitz.
Economics determines all issues, conspiracy explains most events."); see also Grant
Gilmore, From Tort to Contract: Industrializationand the Law, 86 YALE L.J. 788, 797
(1977) (book review) ("What principally disturbs me in Professor Horowitz's excellent
book is that he seems to be proposing a formalism of the left which I find quite as
distasteful as the more familiar formalism of the right.").

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

possible, Horwitz's study of antebellum American law emphasized the
subsidy it gave to capitalistic development.' Hurst described the same
interaction between law and society as a "release of energy.""'
In spite of the differences, the law and society and Critical Legal
Studies movements are both structural approaches to the study of legal
history. Practitioners of both views tend to look for and explicate the
relationship between law and social outcomes. What interests them is
what law does in society, what various actors use law to accomplish.
Both approaches have played important roles in breaking down the idea
of legal history as a celebration of great lawyers' contributions to the
stability of American government and great judges' contributions to the
creation and improvement of legal doctrine.
One of the weaknesses of functional approaches, however, is that they
turn the scholar's vision away from the individuals who think the thoughts
that the scholar studies. In turn, thinking less about individuals makes it
more difficult to appreciate the role that law and legal ideas play in their
lives.3 8 In short, it is more difficult to think about and study legal
culture when the scholarly focus is on the role legal rules and doctrines
play in economic development. Such an approach slights the links
between legal thought and other aspects of the intellectual life of the
particular time and place.3 9 Looldng closely at those links can help us
understand what the past accepted without question but what we in the
present can subject to critical examination. Such studies can be as thought
provoking as the attempt to delineate the structural "reality" behind the
law. Once we learn to critically examine the common sense assumptions
of the past, we may look more carefully at our own commonplaces and
postulates.
Biography can be a fruitful approach to a history of legal culture
because it always concentrates on individuals. These biographies of
36. MORTON J. HoRwrrZ, THE TRANSFORMATION oF AMERIcAN LAW, 1780-1860
(1977).
37. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CoNDTroNS OF FREEDoM IN TH
NNErEENTh-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956).
38. White's recent study of James Bradley Thayer's famous essay on the role of
American courts in judicial review is an example of such a cultural study. At the end
of the work, White calls for more such studies of Thayer and his contemporaries: "We
need to begin to see them as cultural figures rather than as caricatures of formalism or
as progenitors of the Realists." G. Edward White, Revisiting JamesBradley Thayer, 88
Nw. U. L. REV. 48, 83 (1993).
39. Several CLS historians have been interested in intellectual history, however, and
Morton J. Horwitz's second book, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 18701960: THE CRISES OF LEOAL ORTHODOXY (1992), is much more a story of legal ideas
and more closely examines individual thinkers.

1994]

THOUGHTS AND LIVES

Learned Hand and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. provide a wealth of
detailed information with which to begin a study of American legal culture
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The place to begin the inquiry
is the contrasts the books reveal between the lives of Holmes and Hand.
B
One aspect of Hand's life that illustrates the difference between his
world and Holmes's is his version of "jobbism." Holmes's "jobbism",
according to White, was an expression of his supreme self-confidence.
For Hand it was an expression of the modest claims of careful
craftsmanship. Hand's status as a professional was important to him and
certainly was important to his attempts to overcome his doubts and find
a sense of self-worth. One of the staples of historians' understanding of
the early twentieth century is the idea that social status became more and
more a matter of occupation, of social function rather than of social
position.4 ' As American society became more and more national, secure
social status came from membership in a functional group which did
something good for society. Holmes's jobbism was part of his strong
belief in his own talent and his need, and duty, to use it to the full. In
some way, too, duty and jobbism are related to the world of Brahmin
Boston, to Holmes's class. Even their relationships to their fathers
illustrate the contrast. Holmes, Sr. was a physician, but it was through
his writings that he attained fame and status and a position his son could
try to surpass. His was a literary fame, and his son's attempt to equal and
surpass it was as literary as it was legal. Here was a judge who
submerged doctrine in language. Samuel Hand's fame came from his
legal career (at least as it was remembered). It was solely as a lawyer and
jurist that Learned tried to make his mark. Holmes's attempt to find a
place in the world took place through the law while Hand's was within the
law.
All in all, Hand might have had the more difficult task. His father's
early death seems to have magnified his accomplishments, at least in part
because it allowed speculation about what more he could have
accomplished. Holmes, Sr. was constantly on the scene during his son's
struggle to establish himself. At least he was there to see, and, one
hopes, be impressed with and take pride in his son's accomplishments.
Hand could never hope for any sort of approval from the paragon into
which his dead father had been transformed. Perhaps his constant torment
40. Perhaps the best known statement of this view is RIcHARD HoFSTADTER, THE
AGE OF REFORM (1955), expanded on in ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER
1877-1920 (1967).
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over his own incapacity was magnified by the inability to ever find
reassurance.
Certainly Hand required help, and lots of it, trying to find his place
in the law. Holmes, of course, did not simply blunder into his judicial
appointments, but they did not involve an undue amount of arranging.
The appointment to the Massachusetts high court seems simply to have
happened. White mentions the recommendation of Holmes to the
governor by "one W.C. Russell," but no other information seems to exist.
After all, Holmes's grandfather Charles Jackson sat on the court; the
outgoing Republican governor wished to fill the vacancy rather than leave
it to his Democratic successor; Holmes was a Republican, if not a fiercely
partisan one; and he certainly wanted the position.4 1 Appointment to the
United States Supreme Court was a little more problematic and
serendipitous. The "Massachusetts seat" on the court was coming vacant
with the retirement of Horace Gray, but President McKinley resolved to
appoint another, a resolution made moot by an assassin's bullet. Theodore
Roosevelt had admired Holmes's speeches, and his own close friend,
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, was a strong supporter of his friend,
Holmes. In the end, most important was the fact that Holmes was "the
social and intellectual compatriot of Lodge and Roosevelt."4 2
Learned Hand had a more difficult time. His appointment to the
district court came about through lobbying by his friends, especially C.C.
Burlingham, who had access to Taft's Attorney General, George
Wickersham and his brother Henry, a prominent New York lawyer.
Unlike Holmes, Hand was not a "natural" for a judicial appointment. He
needed the help of the better connected. His elevation to the Second
Circuit was greatly aided by the actions of Julius Mayer whose resignation
to return to practice created the vacancy to which Hand was appointed.
Mayer was well connected and "resorted to his wide range of contracts,
from New York Republican senator James Wadsworth to 'the local
political people' to ensure Hand's nomination. "I Hand, of course, never
reached the highest court, but the details of those campaigns, so well told
by Gunther, illustrate how dependant Hand was on influence wielded by
others.'
By the time Hand was considered for the United States Supreme Court
for the last time in 1942, the world was far different from the one in
which Holmes had ascended to the court. The pool of potential appointees
was much larger and, in a sense, there were more layers between the
41.
42.
43.
44.

See WHITE, supranote 1, at 202-08.
Id. at 307.
GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 275.
See id. at 553-70.
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candidates and the president. Holmes knew Roosevelt and was a friend
of Lodge. At best, Hand knew some of the men who counted, but his
friendships stopped with those, like Burlingham or Felix Frankfurter, who
were close to power. Professional competence got one noticed, but actual
access to power required more.
The professional worlds in which these two men lived and worked
differed. Holmes's world was smaller and more personal, one in which
personal acquaintance and being the "right sort" meant a good deal.
Hand, however, lived in a world in which professional competence and
craftsmanship were perhaps even more important than social position, but
the accomplished professional was apt to be at some remove from the
centers of power. Thus, Hand needed friends more than Holmes. And
once again, matters of personality were important. To say that White's
portrayal of Holmes's relationships with others is complex is only a
beginning. In brief, Holmes craved "intimacy," a form of friendship
which involved the sharing of inmost thoughts, "real feelings" without
pretense and without emotional abandon. His relationships with women
especially were governed by this desire, and to White, the most significant
aspect of Holmes's relationship with Clare Castleton was its transcendence
of "intimacy" and development into "romance."'
Holmes's closest
friendships with men were limited to those he considered to have first-rate
intellects and seem to have been few.' Hand found it easier to open
himself to others and was more inclined to form a much greater number
of friendships. Although he had been an outsider in his youth, Gunther
notes, "in New York City's social gatherings, he was now a welcome
guest at last: a lively, brilliant conversationalist with enormously wide
interests, a gift for the ribald story and delightful mimicry, a relish for
rubbing elbows with cultivated acquaintances." 47 In short, Hand was
blessed with (or perhaps cultivated) the very abilities he needed to make
a place for himself in the world. The friends he made were the very men
who helped advance his career.
Different social structures are not the only indicia of change between
Holmes's legal world and Hand's. They thought about law in different
ways and thus went about the job of judging in different ways. Holmes,
of course, is an important figure in the history of Anglo-American
jurisprudence.
"Had he never been a judge," White writes, "The
Common Law would remain one of the great works of jurisprudence...
No previous writer had attempted the distinctive combination of history,
45. WHITE, supranote 1, at 250-52.
46. Id. at 315.
47. GuNTHER, supranote 1, at 408.
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analytics, and policy that Holmes forged in The Common Law. "'s Hand
lived in the jurisprudential world Holmes helped to make, but Holmes was
not the only creator.
Christopher Columbus Langdell appears in Gunther's work as the
exemplar of a narrow, coldly logical view of law which excludes
appreciation of the social function of legal rules. This is to a great degree
the standard view of Langdell and by extension of the changes Langdell
helped to bring to Harvard Law School after he became dean in 1870.
Hand found some good in Langdell's work, but he distrusted Langdell's
attempt to "construct airtight logical structures," an enterprise in which
Hand would not participate.49 The skeptical Hand, following the
example of his hero Holmes, would never attempt to impose a false
coherence on the law.
Once again, however, the Holmes that Hand admired is not the
Holmes that White describes. White explains that the relationship between
Holmes and angdell was not as hostile as has often been believed. First,
Holmes appreciated and approved of the increased rigor of legal education
at Harvard. The case method's emphasis on the study of cases as the
original sources of the law, and the use of the socratic method in class,
made for the scientific study of law of which Holmes approved.'
Langdell and his colleagues made the study of law a worthy and
demanding enterprise. Given Holmes's desire to prove his personal worth
through demanding work, the transformed law school not surprisingly met
with his approval.
Just as significant, and more surprising, perhaps, are the intellectual
affinities between the judge and the dean. Holmes's The Common Law is
a complex and subtle work into which readers haven often projected their
own views. Those views usually are congenial to finding in his work the
beginnings of a type of legal realism. "Holmes has thus been seen,"
White writes,
as a proto-Realist, focusing on the "prejudices" of judges and the
"felt necessities" of generations as shaping forces in the law, as
a legal anthropologist, ranging through the doctrines and practices
of "primitive" societies, as a proto-economist, championing
"empirical" analysis and market-based theories of liability, and
above all as an arch-critic of formalist jurisprudence, the orthodox
48. WHrrE, supranote 1, at 486.
49. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 46-47, 520.
50. WHrIE, supranote 1, at 197-98. Gunther makes the same point, see GUNTHER,
supranote 1, at 47.
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discourse of the late nineteenth-century elite legal profession, of
whom Langdell was one of the high priests.5 1
Careful examination of the work which looks beyond Holmes's "riveting
passages contrasting 'prevalent moral and political theories' with 'the
syllogism'" reveal, according to White, "a methodology strikingly like
that of Langdell." 5 2 Like all of White's analysis, his reading of The
Common Law is subtle and deeply engaged with the text, and a summary
inevitably will not do justice to that analysis. Keeping that warning in
mind, however, it is fair to say that White finds Holmes's most famous
work to embody a methodology which is both historicist and positivistic,
devoted both to doctrine and policy, and which, most importantly, was not
regarded as revolutionary by contemporaries. Indeed, what might today
appear odd to us was an established part of the intellectual milieu.
Holmes could be as "presentist" as Langdell and as devoted to logic in the
development of law. At the same time Holmes was concerned with the
development of doctrine and the social and intellectual forces behind that
development. It seems fair to say that he and Langdell were far closer
intellectually than most twentieth-century commentators have realized.
What has often been portrayed as a difference in kind was a difference in
emphasis.53
Holmes's intellectual development did not end with the publication of
his great book, of course, and White traces a growing positivism in
Holmes's view of law related to his service on the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court. By the time the judge published The Path of the Law in
1897 he was clearly a believer in the idea that judges make the law:
"Older forms were retained or abandoned because their substantive basis
was either endorsed or rejected; judging was inevitably a matter of policy
choices."' White argues that the views expressed in these later works
are at least somewhat different from those Holmes held when he produced
his early essays and The Common Law.' Whether those earlier works
51. WHrTE, supra note 1, at 170.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 178-95.
54. Id. at 222.
55. Id. at 535 n.98. As noted, White links this change in Holmes's thought to his
experience as a judge. Morton Horwitz suggests that Holmes' relationship with Clare
Castleton was the discovery of a "deep love... that produced in Holmes what Freud
called an 'oceanic' feeling, inducing him to transcend the prior categories of his
thought." HoRwrrz, supra note 36, at 143. White believes that Holmes' intellectual
growth led him to Clare Castleton; Horwitz that Clare Castleton, along with the social
and economic upheavals of the 1890's, led Holmes to new ideas. See WHITE, supra note
1, at 138-39.
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contain more than a seed or foreshadowing of the later views is, of
course, a matter of interpretation. In any event, Holmes was always at
least touched by positivism. But so were Langdell and his fellows at
Harvard. Part of the strength of the case method was its assertion that
cases, and the judges who decided them, were the source of law.56 Even
Holmes's later, more "modem" views, then, do not distance him that far
from his contemporaries.
If Holmes's speculations and what was going on at Harvard Law
School were of a piece, it is wofthwhile to think for a bit about the effect
of the transformed Harvard Law School on the young Learned Hand.
Gunther finds that Hand disliked Langdell's overemphasis on logic, but
saw the value in the case method because it drove the student to think for
himself.57 The strongest influence, however, was James Bradley Thayer.
Thayer's views on the limited role of judicial review of legislation were
an important influence on Hand's deferential approach to judging.5 8
There may have been other, less obvious influences, however. For
example, Hand was an expert at distinguishing cases and that skill was an
important part of his judicial technique." 9 The case method gave
intensive training in the close reading and analysis of cases and perhaps
helped influence Hand. In addition, Gunther quotes Hand deprecating
natural law and referring to the sovereign power of the legislature, ideas
which were central to the approach to law that informed the reformed
legal education that had its start at Harvard.'
All these various influences and suggestions come together in
considering one of the most important aspects of Hand's professional life,
his work with the American Law Institute (ALl). Gunther describes the
ALI as "the elite incarnation of the American legal establishment, a select
group of leading practitioners, scholars, and judges committed to 'the
improvement of the law.'"" That improvement was first pursued by the
creation of the Restatements, "which sought to identify and articulate the
governing principles of the common law for the guidance of judges and
56. I have made this argument at length in WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOOIc AND
EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 122-31 (1994).
57. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 46-47.
58. White's study of Thayer's famous essay, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law finds it to advocate a less deferential attitude to
legislatures than is usually believed. White identifies Thayer as a Brahmin legal scientist
whose idea of judicial review is class-based, reflecting "the rationality of Brahmins and
their ilk." White, supranote 35 at 82.
59. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 327.
60. See id. at 250, 494.
61. Id. at 410.
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lawyers."62
Gunther acknowledges that the very concept of the
Restatements "resembled the ambitious schemes of C.C. Langdell... to
construct a logical structure that would form an airtight system of its own
with little regard for the law's social content," but asserts that Hand's
"craftsman's spirit unceasingly pursued the underlying principles amid the
flood of precedents, and he appreciated the Restatements' potential of
guidance for judges and lawyers."'
Whether or not Langdell was
actually hostile to consideration of the law's social context, it is clear that
his idea of legal education, and the idea of legal education exemplified by
his reformed school, placed great emphasis on the law itself as a worthy
subject of study, separate and apart from legislation and considerations of
policy.' Hand's "craftsman's spirit" may in part be a reflection of a
legal education that paid close attention to the careful identification and
explanation of relatively narrow legal principles, extracted from the cases
that were the basis of all study.' The "flood of precedents" was widely
deprecated and even feared by late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century
American lawyers and a project like the Restatements was a coherent
response to those worries. In a way, the entire project was one extended
exercise in sophisticated case method, designed to extract from the raw
material
the best (if not the "true") legal principles which should guide the
.6
courts

Holmes was never as enthusiastic about the ALI as was Hand. At the
time of the founding meeting Holmes wrote Harold Laski:
Some of the virtuous under the call of E[lihu] Root and William
Draper Lewis meet here [in Washington] next week to talk of
restatement of the law (I believe) .... I will try to [look in on
them] but I will take no hand and won't believe till they produce
the good. You can't evoke genius by announcing a corpusjurs.6 7
62. Id. at 411.
63. Id. at 412-13.
64. See LAPANA, supra note 56, at 77, 130.
65. Indeed, in his final Holmes lecture Hand paid tribute to his law school teachers:
"From them I learned it is as craftsmen that we get our satisfaction and our pay."
GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 654.
66. There were exceptions, such as § 90 of the Restatement of Contracts, written
by Samuel Williston which shows that the search for the "best" rules was often guided
by the urge to make better rules. For a thorough discussion of the reformist aspect of

the ALI, see N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspectiveon the Origins
of the American Law Institute, 8 LAW & HIsT. REV. 55-96 (1990).
67. HoLImss-LAsia LErERs: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JusTIcE HOLMES
AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916-1935 at 482 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
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The part of Holmes's intellect which could never accept the overuse of
logic to explain the law may have rebelled against the attempt to carefully
state the "best" rule, no matter what the basis for making the judgment of
what was best. Perhaps Holmes also lacked the enthusiasm for
cooperative ventures like the AL. White strongly emphasizes Holmes's
desire for recognition and documents his strenuous efforts to make his
views well known and accepted by embodying them in striking prose.
"Holmes was thus at bottom an individualist judge in a collegial
profession."' Educated in a school which emphasized the role of the
professional and coming to maturity in an America which gave great
importance to the role of the professional, Hand may have been more
accepting of corporate professional activity. The best law would come
from the cooperative thought of the best lawyers, not through the brave
excursions of the solitary knight.
Still, the similarities again lead to thoughts about the contrast between
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as illustrated by Hand and Holmes.
The Holmes that White portrays would be unlikely to see much value in
group projects in which his own distinctive personality and talents would
be submerged. Gunther's Hand, in contrast, wanted to be part of the
group, perhaps not only because he felt left out and alone, but also
because his vision of being a lawyer was closely tied to being part of a
profession with a collective claim to respect, honor, and even power.
If these two judges were so different, why did the younger so admire,
even idolize, the elder? Surely there is no simple answer to that question,
but part of the answer may be found in the manipulation of Holmes's
image by the same people who were Hand's friends. White explores at
length the remaking of Holmes as a paragon of progressive judging by the
"New Republic crowd" which included Walter Lippmann, Felix
Frankfurter, both of whom were close friends of Hand, and Harold Laski.
As White points out, "Holmes did not fully hold" any of the core beliefs
of the "'New Republic lot'": "that unregulated capitalism was passe; that
experimental regulatory or redistributive legislation . . . should be
encouraged at the state level; that the 'melting pot' was a viable social
ideal; that the future was an improvement upon the past; and that a
beneficent state should become more of a presence as a policy making
force."'
In White's judgment, however, "Holmes' learning,
antecedents, bearing, pithy informal style, and deferential attitude toward
social and economic regulation were more than enough for his
admirers."' The Holmes that Hand admired was not the self-absorbed
philosopher White portrays but rather the Olympian, perfectly restrained
68. WHITE, supra note 1, at 481.
69. Id. at 360.
70. Id.
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judge, totally in control of his craft and himself that Frankfurter and
company, in part at least, created. Perhaps Hand's own reticence and
self-doubts made it easier for him to accept what the presumably wellinformed said about Holmes, especially when what they said made Holmes
an exemplar of the qualities Hand felt he himself lacked.
II
Biography remains one of the most accessible ways of understanding
the past, and perhaps one of the most readable, at least when practiced
with the skill, learning, and style exhibited by both these works. Lives are
interesting, and the emphasis on the interior life may reflect one of the
dominant tendencies of our time, the desire to understand public actors by
understanding their inner selves. In these two instances, that desire really
does lead to revelation. Probing behind the images reveals something
about these two men and about their times. Stripping away the image
built around Holmes reveals an intellectual life much closer to that of his
contemporaries than we have generally been led to believe. Gunther's
story of Hand's life gives much evidence that Hand's thoughts were the
product of his education and of the legal culture of his time, both of which
reinforced and were reinforced by his habits of mind and personality.
Both these works, however, are more than particularly striking
examples of methodology because both the lives they examine cast doubt
on the received wisdom about American legal history in the late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth centuries. To some degree, the same persons who
manufactured the Holmes persona and were Hand's friends also created
the story of a revolt against formalism in which Langdell and his
colleagues were agents of the forces of darkness. These same people were
among the advocates of Legal Realism who claimed Holmes as their
precursor and with some of whose premises Hand agreed.7 1
There are many sources for this view. In the world of law, many of
the early legal realists set up Langdell and his assumed works as the
antithesis of their own approach to law.'
Morton White, in Social
Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism, linked Holmes to
71. Gunther expresses this point of view when he writes that Hand would have
found much in Jerome Frank's work with which to agree. "[Hand] was never a
wholehearted admirer of C.C. Langdell's efforts to construct airtight logical structures,
nor would he have doubted the role of personality and personal biases in judicial decision
making." GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 525.
72. The classic expression is the work of Jerome Frank; for example, his A Plea for
Lawyer Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947), where he characterizes Langdell as "a

brilliant neurotic" and asserts that his ideas of teaching reflected his personality. Id. at
xx.
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such icons of progressive thought as John Dewey, Charles Beard, and
Thorsten Veblen in their opposition to a society built on unquestioned
verities.' In the ongoing discussion, Langdell and to some lesser degree
his colleagues at Harvard Law School were lumped with the bad guys and
made exemplars of a wooden and over-intellectualized approach to law.
It is as if Langdell and the early advocates of legal education founded on
the case method were one with the justices of the United States Supreme
Court who produced the decision in Lochner v. New York.74
Both works under consideration here, however, cast doubt on that
story. White carefully shows that Holmes and Langdell both participated
in a legal culture which honored logic as a means of understanding law.
Hand's particular strengths as a judge, as described by Gunther, certainly
owe a good deal to his education at the supposed citadel of formalism.
The stories of both these lives should help turn our investigation of
American legal thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
to new paths.

The world in which Hand came to maturity in the law was one in
which the legal profession was also coming to a sort of maturity. As
noted above, one of the contrasts between Holmes and Hand involves the
nature of their life's ambition, the way they went about making a mark.
Holmes worked through the law to obtain the recognition and renown he
so fervently desired. In the process he had to carefully balance his
literary ambition with the technical demands of judging. Indeed, most of
his interaction with his judicial colleagues "came primarily in the form of
their removing too vivid or too sweeping passages in his draft opinions
rather than any deliberation over the merits of the case." 75
The contrast with Hand's judicial style could not be greater. Gunther
recounts at length the pains Hand took to shape each argument and craft
each opinion. During his tenure on the Second Circuit, each decision was
preceded by the preparation by each judge of a pre-conference
memorandum, the preparation of which required each judge to thoroughly
think through each case. In Hand's case, these memos reveal "the sheer
joyful thoroughness with which he tackled each case." 76 Taught law by
73. MORTON WHITE, SociAL THOUGHT IN AMERIcA: THE REVOLT AGAINST

FORMALISM 74-75, 105-06 (1957).
74. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
75. WHrr, supra note 1, at 481.
76. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 291-303. The difference in judicial style between
the two men may help explain their disagreement over First Amendment jurisprudence.
Gunther's description of the colloquy between the two judges can be read to show that
Holmes was simply impatient with Hand's careful dissection of the problems involved,
which Holmes seemed to see more in grand terms of the rights of the majority which
reduced some of these now famous cases to "essentially routine criminal appeals." Id.
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the case method, Hand approached the work of writing judicial opinions
with the vigor the student was supposed to exhibit in ripping apart those
same opinions. Hand's work involved the application of a special legal
skill while Holmes's judging called on a broader range of talents.'
The larger point is that one of the characteristics of a profession is the
possession by its practitioners of a special skill. Hand's technical
competence and concern for technical competence, just as his view of
judging, were related to his education. In the conventional story, Langdell
and company are guilty of separating the study of law from the study of
society, a separation which Holmes deprecated in his classic statement
about the relative roles of logic and experience in the life of the law.
White shows, however, that the famous statement does not make Holmes
so different from Langdell and other legal thinkers of his time. What has
often been ignored is that the exclusion of non-legal topics from legal
education was part of a conscious intellectual strategy. It was dictated by
the view of law as what judges actually enforce and became a valuable
weapon to use against the view of law as eternal principles. Langdell
himself clearly believed that law schools should content themselves with
teaching law as it is. The study of jurisprudence, he wrote to a
correspondent, of "what the law ought to be," is the province of "those
aiming at public life or a high order of journalism.""
One of the
rallying cries of Legal Realism, of course, was the claim to separate the
is and the ought for purposes of studying law. It is ironic to find
something of the same view held by the high priest of formalism. Leaving
the ought, which we moderns might identify as public policy, to other than
lawyers certainly could help produce judges like Hand who deferred to the
legislature. 79
at 164.
77. I do not mean to give the slightest impression that Hand was a philistine. Just
the opposite was true. Gunther shows that Hand read widely and loved ideas and
language as much as he loved the law. His pre-conference memos were liberally salted
with literary and philosophical allusions. Id. at 292. The point is that these intellectual
flights were limited to pre-conference memos.
78. Letter from C.C. Langdell to T.D. Woolsey (Feb. 6, 1871), in WOOLSEY
FAMILY PAPERs, Series I, Box 23, folder 433, Yale University Library, Ms. Div.,
quoted in LAPIANA, supranote 56, at 77.
79. Of course, such an approach to legal education could mask or even justify a
mindless acceptance of things as they are and lead to opposition to any sort of change.
I believe, however, that this approach to the study of law promoted lawyerly acceptance
of at least some varieties of social change by casting doubt on the verities of the past and
by giving lawyers a claim to professional competence and social position based less on
the defense of a particular set of ideas about society and government than on apparently
apolitical technical expertise.
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Paradoxically, it may also have made it easier for lawyers to attain
political leadership by surrendering overtly political stances. In his study
of the Pollock v. FarmersLoan and Trust entitled Conservative Crises
and the Rule of Law, Arnold Paul chronicled the outrage and fear of bar
association speakers confronted with the attempt to enact a federal income
tax in the 1890's.81 To put it crudely, many of these speakers, and
perhaps many of their listeners, were adherents of a view which found an
income tax to be a legislative and majoritarian violation of the eternal
principle declaring the sanctity of private property.
With the dawn of the twentieth century came a fundamental shift in
American political life which we usually call the Progressive Era. And
while "progressivism" is difficult to describe and even more difficult to
define, it can be said that extreme views on the sanctity of private
property became politically far less palatable in a society dominated more
and more by a middle class which possessed some property but also saw
itself as consumers and possible victims of the concentration of wealth.
Negative reaction to the Lochner case, the growth of anti-monopoly
sentiments, and even perhaps the eventual passage of the Sixteenth
Amendment validating an income tax, all evidence this change. In such
a world, a profession which proclaimed itself day in and day out to be out
of sympathy with dominant political forces might fear for its position. By
turning to more technical, narrow concerns, lawyers and judges may have
been securing broader influence by renouncing overt political activity.
Whether this change was powered by deliberate choice on the part of some
lawyers or whether it was an unplanned response to change, or whether
it was more or less of both, by the 1920s the new position was clearly set
out.
In this context, the founding of the ALI is especially important.
Gunther notes that Hand was not always overwhelmingly enthusiastic
about the Restatements. He was deeply involved in the ALI because it
allowed him to associate with law teachers and gave him a welcome social
An approach to legal education focused on technical rules could also inculcate a
certain modesty in students. No longer was the lawyer the master of all that was
necessary to understand society, a natural member of the governing class. As the case
model law schools stripped from their curricula cultural courses such as Roman law,
oratory, and political science they promoted a vision of a profession devoted to the more
mundane, and subtly controlling, role of facilitating others' use of the legal system. See
LAPIANA, supra note 56, at 144. It is possible that this modesty is yet another
contributor to Hand's restrained view of the judicial function.
80. 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (holding that a federal tax on rents, income from real
estate, or interest on muniepal bonds is a direct tax in violation of the Consitution).
81. See ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISES AND THE RULE OF LAW (2d ed.
1976).
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outlet. The ALI was a group of leading professionals working together
to better the science of their profession without expressing an overt
political agenda.' The esprit de corps the organization fostered helped
to reinforce its members' vision of the importance of their role in society.
Another illustration of the turn to technical expertise is the amount of
time and energy law professors and at least some bar associations poured
into the attempt to enact procedural reform of the type eventually
embodied in the Federal Code of Civil Procedure. It is convenient to find
the beginning of that movement in 1906, the date of Roscoe Pound's
address before the American Bar Association entitled The Causes of
PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration of Justice.' Pound listed
four major sources of the dissatisfaction he saw. Some were common to
all legal systems. They were the natural result of regular procedures
necessary to protect litigants against personal prejudice and of the
inevitable gap between law and the developing moral sense of the
community. Other causes were peculiar to the Anglo-American legal
system. The individualistic nature of the common law was out of joint
with an increasingly collectivist age, and the constitutional guarantees of
the rights of both natural and artificial persons frustrated attempts to
redress wrongs and prevent harms. In addition, the contentious nature of
common law procedure had been exaggerated in America until the
administration of justice had become a game. Other causes were related
to judicial organization and procedure. There were too many courts with
overlapping jurisdictions and too many cases were decided not on the
merits but on points of practice and procedure. The last category of
causes was related to social perceptions of courts and lawyers. The public
expected the courts to do their job but did not fund them properly, yet
blamed them for every perceived miscarriage of justice, often abetted by
irresponsible reporting in the press. Courts themselves were too involved
in politics. Too many lawyers approached the practice not as a profession
but as a business."
Pound's list of causes does not seem to be particularly dated. Many
of the same complaints are made today. Far more interesting is his
prescription for the role lawyers should play in solving the problem. He
summarized by noting that some causes

82. C. N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective On the Origins
of the American Law Institute, 8 LAW & HIST. REV. 55 (1990) (suggesting that the ALI
had a self-conscious reformist agenda).
83. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration
of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 241, 273 (1964).
84. See id.
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inhere in all law and are the penalty we pay for uniformity; that
some inhere in our political institutions and are the penalty we
pay for local self-government and independence from bureaucratic
control; that some inhere in the circumstances of an age of
transition and are the penalty we pay for individual freedom of
thought and universal education.
These will take care of
themselves. But too much of the current dissatisfaction has a just
origin in our judicial organization and procedure. The causes that
lie here must be heeded. Our administration of justice is not
decadent. It is simply behind the times.'
Pound's speech, which to modem readers seems almost routine,
caused consternation among some of his listeners. A motion to reprint it
and circulate it among the bar met with furious opposition. Apparently,
the temerity Pound showed in criticizing the courts was not appreciated.
Years later, John Henry Wigmore recalled that the nature of the speech
was so different form the self-congratulatory rhetoric that usually flowed
on such occasions that "the conservatives were hotly impatient to suppress
the whole matter."' In the end, the subject matter of the speech was
referred to a special committee of the American Bar Association which
became an important force in working for reform of procedure. These
efforts eventually led to the adoption of the Federal rules, at the core of
which was the idea that the judges (and experts appointed by them) should
write the rules, subject only to legislative veto.
The second cause of dissatisfaction that Pound insisted lawyers must
address involved judicial organization. The American Judicature Society,
founded in Chicago in 1913, and closely associated with several reformminded law teachers, worked hard to promote the idea of a unified court
system. While the society's materials provided alternative systems to suit
local needs, the favored model for a state-wide system featured a unified
General Court of Judicature, an elective chief justice who appointed judges
of the Appeals division and the Superior Court division, and elective
county judges. The model municipal court was similar. An elected chief
justice appointed his associates who sat in appellate, chancery, domestic
relations, civil jury, and civil non-jury divisions.' The great goal was
85. Id. at 290.
86. John Henry Wigmore, Roscoe Pound'sSt. PaulAddressof 1906: The Spark that
Kindled the White Flame of Progress, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 177 (1936-37).
87. American JudicatureSociety, Bulletin VII, FirstDraft of a State-Wide Judicature
Act, and Bulletin IV, First Draftof an Act to Establish a Model Courtfor a Metropolitan
District (Chicago, 1914). On the AJS, see MICHAL R. BELKNAP, To IMPROVE THE
ADMaINSTRATION Op JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE AMEmCAN JUDICATURE SOCmTY
(1992).
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to provide expert management for the court system and one elected official
who would be held responsible by the public for the performance of the
courts.
These suggestions for reform all centered around the expertise of the
legal professionals who proposed them and presumably would be
responsible for making them work.' 8 The reliance on expertise brings
us to another important aspect of the transition from the nineteenth century
to the twentieth: the importance of political progressivism. White shows
that Holmes's reputation was made by "the New Republic crowd," even
though Holmes did not truly share most of their social and political views.
Hand himself was part of that crowd, and was deeply involved in politics,
especially at the time of Theodore Roosevelt's Bull Moose campaign in
1912. For progressive lawyers, substantive due process was the great
battleground, and, of course, Holmes's dissent in Lochner certainly looked
like a thoroughgoing rejection of that doctrine.
White shows, however, that Holmes did not share the values of the
younger generation. He was "an unreconstructed social Darwinist" who
believed in competition and in combination as "the logical end of
competition." 9 He was uninterested in humanizing the workplace and
found redistributive legislation meaningless.
What he did believe,
however, was that judges must defer to legislatures "absent an
overwhelming textual mandate. " 90 That translated, of course, into
opposition to many of the applications of substantive due process to
overturn "reformist" legislation, although Holmes cared little for its
reformist nature.
88. One of the striking aspects of Pound's 1906 speech was the assertion that the
"causes of dissatisfaction" which he related to social and intellectual changes would "take
of themselves." Perhaps he was not being totally candid. Although Pound did devote
time and energy to bringing about procedural reform, as a scholar, he devoted time and
energy to creating a sociological jurisprudence that would provide the rationale and
method for curing those very causes of dissatisfaction he slighted when addressing
practitioners. The delineation of Pound's motives and agenda (if he had one) are far
beyond the scope of this essay, but the implied limitation of lawyers to technical reform
lends some support to the argument that the position of the legal profession was tied to
technical expertise.
Any consideration of the movement for procedural reform must also take into
account EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY

JURISDICrrON IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICAN, 1870-1958 (1992). Purcell examines federal
diversity jurisdiction as a social litigation system and shows that the Supreme Court
manipulated procedural doctrines to benefit or harm different players in that system. See
id. at 244-94.
89. WHIrE, supra note 1, at 360.
90. Id.
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What he did care about was a proper understanding of the nature of
law. "The great Mllacy in jurisprudential thinking, Holmes believed, was
the idea that judicial authority came from somewhere other than the
sovereignty of the state." 9 ' White shows that Holmes was not always
consistent in applying this core belief. He happily used the federal
common law, whose very existence he found jurisprudentially unsound,
to write his views on negligence into law.' The point, however, is that
Holmes's jurisprudence, similar to that of the Harvard law teachers who
were briefly his colleagues, made him defer to the legislature.
Hand held much the same view. He strongly opposed the use of
substantive due process to invalidate reformist legislation. He believed
that the role of the judge was to interpret the law by finding the meaning
in the sovereign's "formal declarations," not in transitory popular opinion
and certainly not in the judge's own opinions.'
Like many eastern
progressives, according to Gunther, Hand believed that "true
progressivism required national policy-making based on expertise."'
Hand hailed the. creation of the Federal Trade Commission because it
would be "an administrative agency of experts" creating "standards of
antitrust policy."I He hoped "it might at last relieve the courts of the
antitrust tasks they were so unfit to handle."'
Gunther is not as explicit about Hand's jurisprudential beliefs as White
is about Holmes's, but it seems fair to at least suggest, that just as Hand's
legal education impressed him with the importance of narrow technical
legal expertise, it also made him see law as the product of sovereign
power. His teachers and Holmes were all enemies of law based on
unexamined a priori assumptions. They used the history of law to explain
and critique current law by showing that the law changed with changing
ideas. Even more importantly, they worked to limit the study of law to
what lawyers and judges actually do. The unceasing attack on Langdell
and on the case method as a means of "isolating" law from life (an
isolation to be cured by somehow bringing the social sciences into the law
school) has impeded any understanding of the connection between limiting
the study of law to the study of judicial decisions and the defeat of the
ideas that are usually associated with "Lochnerism." The true enemy of
a "realistic" view of law was not the technical learning of the case method
law school, but a widely held view of law as the expression of eternal
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 379.
See id. at 390.
GuNTHER, supra note 1, at 215, 248-49.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 247.
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truth. Most of the varieties of this view of law revolved around the notion
that legal principles were the product of historical development, which
itself was beyond the control of the people who lived it. It was, in a
word, teleological. Sometimes the principles were equated with the will
of God; sometimes they were the product of a secular but nevertheless
inescapable evolution. The first variety harkened back to antebellum
views of law; the second owed more to the work of Henry Maine and to
often confused ideas about the implications of Darwinian evolution for the
study of society.'
The point is that the case method law school was founded on a view
of law diametrically opposed to a view of law as eternal principles.
Hand's legal education probably contributed at least as much as his
personality to his restrained and modest view of judging. Taught that law
was what judges and legislatures did and taught by a method which often
subjected judicial opinions to severe scrutiny, Hand was unlikely to utter
oracular pronouncements about freedom of contract.
It is possible, then, that realism was not as different from what went
before as the participants have led us to believe, or, at least, that the story
of realism is a story of gradual, incremental change rather than one of a
great leap in understanding. The positivistic and narrow legal science of
the first case-method teachers helped to undermine the foundations of the
sort of legal thinking that made substantive due process possible. It
mocked the idea of law as, in Holmes's memorable phrase, "a brooding
omnipresence in the sky,""8 and insisted that it could only be the product
of sovereign power. That belief supported a deferential approach to
judging, especially since it complemented the young twentieth century's
belief in the efficacy of expertise in finding answers to social problems.
It was also more than convenient that the same approach to the nature of
law helped to secure the position of the lawyer as one of the experts on
whom society so clearly needed to rely.
If realism's distinguishing characteristic was the focus on the is and
not the ought, on what law does and is supposed to do in society rather
than on the mechanical application of a priori principles, then its lineage
really does go back to that day in 1870 when Langdell began to teach
97. These ideas, often now labelled "historicist" or "historicism," are receiving
more and more scholarly scrutiny. See LAPLANA, supra note 56, at 132-47; HoRWrrZ,
supranote 36, at 118-23; William P. LaPiana, A Jurisprudenceof History and Truth:
ConservativeLegal Thought in the GildedAge, 23 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 519 (1992); Stephen
A. Siegel, Historicism in Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Thought, 1990 WIs.
L.REv. 1431 (1990); Louise A. Halper, Christopher G. Tiedeman, "Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism"and the Dilemmas of Small-Scale Propertyin the Gilded Age, 51 OHIo
ST. L.J. 1349 (1990).
98. Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917).
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using the case method. Nothing lasts forever, of course, and judges like
Hand and Frankfirter who were at the cutting edge before the Second
World War began to look somewhat old fashioned afterwards. To make
a sweeping claim, the mainstream left them in a backwater because their
positivism no longer appealed to legal thinkers. Legal culture changed.
In part, the war itself contributed to that change.' Unlimited sovereign
power looked very dangerous with the example of Nazi Germany staring
lawyers in the face. Even more important, perhaps, was the rough
equation of the sovereign with the legislature which dominated a world
where substantive due process review of social and economic legislation
was the principal problem. Progressivism depended on the expert working
through the legislature. Somewhere along the way the legislature not only
lost its mantle of authority but became the very source of the evils the law
must remedy, especially racial discrimination. Today, of course, the
reputations of state legislatures and Congress are at low ebb. Instead of
the representatives of the sovereign people, they seem to be the preserve
of special interests, responsive not to the public good but to the political
action committees that can provide the funds to insure re-election. It is
up to courts, then, to protect the people from the legislature by once again
vigorously enforcing meaningful constitutional limits on legislative actions.
It is not surprising that by the end of his life Hand seemed somewhat out
of step with American legal culture. He had not changed, the grounds of
the debate had.
The divergence between Hand's views and some of the legal thought
of the mid-twentieth century is well illustrated by his Holmes Lectures,
delivered in 1958 at Harvard Law School. He was eighty-six years old
at the time, still vigorous, and still deeply engaged with what had been
truly his life's work. What made his lectures controversial was their
"nub": "a modestly phrased but unmistakably bold challenge to what was
already well on its way to becoming the reigning philosophy of the widely
admired Warren Court."" In 1958, of course, even modest, carefully
nuanced criticism of the United States Supreme Court was bound to cause
a sensation, especially when delivered by "the nation's most highly
regarded judge, renowned as the most articulate advocate of liberty...
"1 As Gunther points out, opposition to the decision in Brown v.
Board of Education," handed down in 1954 and outlawing racial
segregation in public schools, "was near its zenith," and the Court had
99. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRisis OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 159-78 (1973).
100. GUNTHER, supranote 1, at 654.
101. Id. at 655.
102. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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deeply offended the "subversion hunters" by rendering decisions that made
their crusade more difficult."
Hand attacked the notion that the Court should be a third chamber of
the legislature, and called into question the entire structure of judicial
review. At most, he found judicial review to be desirable for prudential
reasons and not required by the Constitution itself. Thus he had no more
patience with judicial activism in defense of personal rights that he had for
judicial activism in defense of property rights. The only area in which he
saw a place for judicial control of "legislative excesses" was in the realm
of the First Amendment. There it was the majority and the legislatures
they controlled which were likely to oppress those dissidents whom the
Amendment was designed to protect." 4 As that argument shows, Hand
rested his argument, at bottom, on democracy. "For Hand, the notion of
seeking the courts' aid under the due process clauses in order to protect
liberal values was ultimately negated by his belief in the democratic
process-the right of the people and their representatives to decide
controversial issues for themselves, rather than being ruled by the policy
choices of an unelected, unresponsive, undemocratic judiciary.""
I.
Hand's view, then, Brown "constituted impermissible second-guessing of
legislative choices. "I'
Gunther concludes that Hand's views had changed by the time of the
Holmes Lectures only to the extent of an increased skepticism about the
worth of judicial activism. I Some of that change Gunther traces to the
influence of Felix Frankfurter. Hand and Frankfurter had been friends
and correspondents for decades, and by the 1950s, when Hand seldom
read Supreme Court opinions for himself, "Frankfurter's letters were his
only direct pipeline to the Court and his most important source of
103. GUNTHER, supra note 1 at 654. Referring to Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178 (1975) (suggesting constitutional barriers to congressional investigations of
subversion by overturning a conviction that was based on defendant's refusal to answer
whether he knew anyone who was a member of the Communist party, and holding the
conviction violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the
defendant was not given a fair opportunity to determine whether he was within his rights
in refusing to answer) and Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (interpreting the Smith
Act narrowly in overturning conviction of fourteen members of the Communist Party of
California by holding the Act did not prohibit advocacy and teaching of forcible
overthrow of the government as an abstract principle absent an effort to instigate to that
end).
104. GUNTHER, supranote 1 at 656-58.
105. Id. at 383 (describing Hand's views in 1920's).
106. Id. at 657.
107. See id. at 664.
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information about Court decisions. ""' Gunther shows that those letters
deeply influenced Hand's thought and changed his views on Brown. Hand
originally believed that Brown was an equal protection case and that it
really stood for the proposition that any law that treated Americans
differently based on race was unconstitutional. Frankfurter did everything
possible to convince Hand that the opinion really was about education. It
was, in this view, a case in which the Court did the substantive due
process thing:
it had substituted its judgment for that of the
legislature. 1" Why did Frankfurter work so hard to convert Hand to his
point of view? Gunther shows that Frankfurter was deeply worried about
the possibility that the Court would strike down state anti-miscegenation
laws. Such a decision would lead to even more attacks on the Court and
impede the attempt to enforce compliance with Brown.'
Concerned
with protecting the institutional position of the Court, Frankfurter misled
Hand.
If we discount the machinations of Justice Frankfurter, it is clear that
Hand did not change very much; the American legal world did.
Positivism and progressivism nourished a belief in democracy (or at least
middle class democracy) and in a notion of law and lawyering appropriate
to democracy. Law itself dealt with technical questions involved in
making the world work, and since its source was the sovereign, there was
no reason for it not to promote the good working of society. In the
nineteenth century the first part of that proposition struggled for
acceptance. In the twentieth century, the general triumph of a positivistic
view of law made possible more and more careful consideration of the
relationship between technical law and the working of society. Thus, in
broad terms, realism, with its emphasis on social facts, is at the end point
of a continuous arc of changing legal culture.
IV
These suggestions are not much more than speculation, but what is
certain is that further investigation into the nature of realism and of
108. Id. at 665.
109. See id. at 667-71.

110. See id. at 666-67. Gunther's explanation is supported by Michael S. Ariens,
A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620-76 (1990), which shows
that Frankfurter manipulated the historical record in an attempt to show that Justice
Owen Roberts did not change his mind and produce the "switch in time that saved nine."
According to Ariens, Frankfurter believed that a candid admission that Roberts had taken
account of the political threat of FDR's court-packing plan would weaken the position
of the Court. For a thorough analysis of the birth of the New Deal Court, see Barry
Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201-61 (1994).
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American legal culture in the twentieth century will be greatly aided by
the insights and understanding exhibited in these two life stories. White's
careful parsing of Holmes's thought reveals the postivistic ground shared
by important American legal thinkers of the pre-realist era, and shows us
that Langdell and his methods were both less revolutionary and more
significant than has been thought. Gunther's detailed telling of Hand's life
shows how education shaped by the ideas of Holmes's generation
influenced its professional children and helped to produce the modem
American legal world.
Whatever use historians make of these works, for the general reader,
and certainly for any lawyer, the revelation of the character and
personality of both men is inherently interesting. But students of
American legal history can also learn from, and should heed, both
biographers' skillful use of careful portraits of their subjects' inner lives
to illuminate their legal lives. While future scholars trace the subtle lines
of influence and thought that mark the transition to legal realism and the
legal thought of the later twentieth century, they must pay attention to the
persons involved. They should heed the lesson of both these works, that
the interplay between life and work is worth exploring."'

111. N.E.H. Hull's article on the'controversy between Pound and Karl Llewellyn
illustrates the possibilities. She shows that the contretemps over Pound's HarvardLaw
Review article on the realists and Llewellyn's rather stiff reply is rooted in part in
clashing personalities and generational differences. N.E.H. Hull, Reconstructing the
Origins of Realistic Jurisprudence: A Prequel to the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange Over
Legal Realism, 1989 DUMM L.J. 1302, 1318-33 (1989).

